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dence and bewilderment among the intellec- 
tuals-has been overtaken by a tempest that 
the critical theorist may well find both invigor- 
ating and troubling. 
In Germany, furthermore, the struggle over 
the public sphere has taken a decisive turn. No 
doubt the most impassioned and significant 
essays of The New Conservatism are those 
written as contributions to the continuing dis- 
cussion of the role of the intellectuals and the 
university, the work of Heidegger and Carl 
Schmitt, and especially the "historians' debate" 
that broke out shortly after Reagan's juggling 
act of Bitburg and Bergen-Belsen. Now at 
issue, as Habermas insists, is the public use of 
history and the integrity of the public sphere, 
the only sphere where crimes and damages 
from the past can ever be settled. For Haber- 
mas postwar history must never retreat to 
apologetics while hiding behind the protective 
shield of science. If collective memory is used 
to create a constructive national idea, it must 
be a "constitutional patriotism" firmly an- 
chored in the political experience of a Federal 
Republic of Germany that "opened itself with- 
out reservation to the political culture of the 
West" (p. 227). That accomplishment, for 
Habermas, is his generation's greatest legacy. 
But is critical history in jeopardy? Can the 
public sphere be renewed? Since October 1989 
such questions have become even more insis- 
tent than before. The answers of the present 
are equivocal and divided. In their matter-of- 
factness Habermas' efforts may exemplify the 
kind of critical discourse the public sphere 
must now hope to sustain. 
LAWRENCE A. ScAFN 
University of Arizona 
Politics, Innocence, and the Limits of Goodness. 
By Peter Johnson. London: Routledge, 
1988. 283p. $35.00. 
This engaging study serves to illuminate 
political morality by exploring, in literature as 
well as in philosophical texts, the nature of 
moral innocence. The exploration is finely 
tuned and well informed. An introductory 
chapter is followed by critical analyses of 
Greek and Kantian treatments of virtuous ac- 
tion and political morality. In the third chapter 
Machiavelli's views are interpreted, as are con- 
temporary analyses of the "dirty hands" prob- 
lem by such theorists as Walzer, Thomas 
Nagel, and Bernard Williams; and the vice of 
pride is thoughtfully dissected with the help of 
Shakespeare and Hume. In the next chapter the 
meaning and import of absolute morality- 
and absolute virtue-is presented. In chapter 5 
we discover the author's philosophical eanings 
as he goes about interpreting Hegel, Nietzsche, 
and Arendt on innocence, morality, and poli- 
tics. Chapter 6 commends literature as an anti- 
dote to the abstractions and generalizations in- 
flicted by moral and political philosophers. 
Chapters 7-9 explore three literary texts for 
their bearings on the issues at hand. A tenth 
chapter defends the proposition that moral 
character, action, and outcome are not just 
contingently related but are instead inherently, 
and so inevitably, connected. 
The author has given the subject matter the 
kind of scrutiny it requires. I cannot do justice 
to the book's plenitude here. Among the riches 
I count two central claims: that an adequate 
understanding of political morality requires 
paying attention to moral character or disposi- 
tion and that certain kinds of moral character 
have no place in politics. Moral innocence ex- 
emplifies these claims. Inspection of this moral 
disposition renders more complete and con- 
crete our understanding of morality and 
politics and the connections between the two; 
and it is a disposition that neither can nor 
should be sustained in the public realm. 
The innocents to whom Johnson refers are 
not those who suffer politics or are corrupted 
by it; nor does he mean those merely ignorant 
of, or naive about politics. The innocent here 
are active agents who embody absolute virtue. 
Their virtue is absolute because unbounded 
(e.g., by duty), pure because valued for its 
own sake, and incorruptible. But their abso- 
lute adherence to absolute virtue is completely 
unreflective: they do not know why they value 
virtue; and they do not resist corruption 
through moral strength but, rather, are natu- 
rally immune to it. Their ignorance, then, is 
distinctive as well: it encompasses not merely 
lack of prudence and an inability to learn from 
experience but also, more centrally, ignorance 
of evil. Moral innocence does not, because it 
cannot, negotiate with evil. 
Moral innocence also appears in different 
guises, a fact moral and political philosophers 
usually miss and almost never investigate. In- 
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deed, that they generally fail to recognize the 
multiplicity of moral dispositions and the bear- 
ing of these on political morality is, as I have 
intimated, one of Johnson's central charges. 
Literature can, he argues, help here. Three 
texts are selected to help in the case of moral 
innocence: Shakespeare's Henry VI, Melville's 
Billy Budd, and Graham Greene's Quiet Amer- 
ican (whose innocent is Pyle, a Harvard 
graduate committed to bringing democracy to 
Indochina). All three characters are active 
forces in the public realm, but Henry's moral 
innocence appears as weakness and vacilla- 
tion, Billy's as mute, unschooled purity that 
can express itself publicly only through vio- 
lence, and Pyle's as fanaticism, reflecting prin- 
ciples provided by the Harvard library and a 
determination rooted in the liberal conviction 
that goodwill and sound principle can deter- 
mine the course of political life. 
That each of these characters produce 
disaster in the political realm is not surprising: 
Henry ruins a kingdom, Billy kills a superior 
officer, and Pyle kills for "America." But why, 
precisely, are we unsurprised? Probably 
because we are not in this area Kantians; we 
are not surprised when good persons do bad 
things in politics because we do not believe 
that politics can be construed simply as a field 
of application for rules arrived at in morality. 
Probably, in other words, we believe in some 
sort of consequentialist realism instead. On 
this view morality and politics are in frequent 
conflict if not altogether divided because vir- 
tue-typically in the vague form of "con- 
science" or "principle"-often has to give way 
so that greater evils may be avoided or some 
good achieved. Politics is a tough business, a 
realm of tragedy and/or moral pragmatism. 
Good politicians know this and so compromise 
with evil on consequentialist grounds; but 
good men like Henry and Pyle do not and so 
produce bad results. 
Drawing in part on Hegel and Arendt, John- 
son argues that this is not right. The key is to 
recognize that "it is not an accident that the 
moral innocents in all three texts are murdered, 
executed, or assassinated" and that each is 
thereby justly rewarded (p. 245). Their moral- 
ity is unfit for politics because in that essential 
and valuable realm their goodness becomes, 
necessarily and inevitably, evil. A mature 
morality recognizes this and so properly limits 
itself, as Captain Vere must recognize Billy's 
guilt and take responsibility for his execution. 
Politics is indeed a tough business; but it is so 
less because virtue has so often to be compro- 
mised than because absolute virtue has to be 
sacrificed. And politics is indeed an autono- 
mous realm; but "whether moral considera- 
tions protect or threaten [it] depends on the 
moral disposition involved" (p. 245). Generali- 
zations are unwelcome here. 
DANIEL R. SABIA, JR. 
University of South Carolina 
Surviving Power: Exercising It and Giving It 
Up. By Xandra Kayden. New York: Free 
Press, 1990. 216p. $22.95. 
Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of 
Business in America. By David Vogel. New 
York: Basic Books, 1989. 352p. $20.95. 
Three Faces of Power. By Kenneth E. Boulding. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989. 259p. 
$28.00. 
Power is enormously complex. Rather than 
being a single phenomenon, it is a complicated 
set of phenomena-as these three books attest. 
Drawing on interviews, Xandra Kayden takes 
us "up close and personal" to consider what in- 
dividuals experience both when they hold 
power and when they relinquish it, treating 
power as a matter of occupying positions of 
high responsibility. David Vogel examines the 
capacity of U.S. business to shape the terms of 
public debate and influence policy choice, 
viewing power in terms of group conflict. Ken- 
neth Boulding provides the most wide-ranging 
treatment, sketching in broad strokes the inter- 
relations of three forms of power, enlarging 
the usual notions of coercion, exchange, and 
persuasion into what he terms threat power, 
economic power, and integrative power and 
then applying them to interpersonal relations 
and organizations. 
Political psychologists will find Kayden's 
book of special interest. Her concern is not 
what people do with power "but what it does 
to people: what it is like to get it and use it, and 
what happens when it is lost" (p. 3). Kayden's 
book concentrates on how the experience of 
power tests the character of people, but she 
points us toward other important lines of in- 
quiry as well. In particular, Kayden suggests 
that holding power is a transforming experi- 
969 
